Abstract. The paper examines the case in which the capital market is populated by informed and uninformed investors. The uninformed try to extract information from informed investors' trades. This opens up the possibility that if informed investors are forced to sell emerging market securities to meet margin calls, for example, this action may be misread by the uninformed investors as signaling low returns in emerging markets. The paper presents a simple model in which this type of Wall Street confusion may result in a collapse in emerging markets' output.
1 In Calvo (1998 a) I have argued that the analysis underlying the sustainability of current account deficits leaves much to be desired, but the topic will not be discussed because it is not central for our purposes here.
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I. Introduction
Prior to the Tequila crisis of 1994/5 in Mexico, balance-of-payments crises in emergingmarket economies were quickly attributed to macroeconomic mismanagement, the first and foremost suspect always being an 'unsustainable' fiscal deficit. The Mexican crisis questioned this conventional view because the country was coming from a long stability period in which important structural reform projects were undertaken and, on the whole, fiscal deficit had been brought under control. After a little while, however, the conventional wisdom started to change, and consensus began to shift in the direction of focusing not just on the fiscal deficit, but on the current account deficit-undoubtedly a more encompassing measure of a country's deficit.
Mexico showed some weaknesses in that respect, because its current account deficit was about 8 percent in 1994 and was programmed to rise to 9 percent in 1995. This was considered 'unsustainable' for Mexico, given its poor growth record.
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The new crisis paradigm had hardly begun to fly when Asia fell into disarray. The unsustainability flag could not easily be raised in this instance, especially for countries like Korea and Indonesia. It was then that, for the first time, the conventional wisdom started to pay serious attention to what is likely to be central to all recent crises, namely, financial sector weaknesses.
Looking at the financial sector, one begins to find threads that are common to all emerging markets. A salient aspect was the existence of short-term debt which, in most cases, was denominated in foreign exchange (and, thus, could not be liquidated through devaluation) and, in several instances, a weak and poorly supervised domestic financial system. However, before the pieces of the puzzle could be put together, Russia announced (in August 1998) a surprise partial repudiation of its public debt. Russia's trade with most emerging markets is insignificant (particularly with those located in Latin America), and its GDP represents a scant 1 percent of world's output. However, the shock wave spread all over emerging markets, and even hit financial centers. What happened?
The dominant theory is that-due to market incompleteness and financial vulnerabilities-many economies around the globe, and especially emerging-market economies, exhibit multiple equilibria. No one has yet provided a good theory about equilibrium selection, but multiple-equilibrium models allow to make statements like 'upon seeing Russia default, investors thought that other emerging-markets countries would follow suit, tried to pulled out and drove those economies into a crisis equilibrium.' Moreover, in a formal model exhibiting multiple equilibria, the crisis can be made consistent with rationality (models that can be adapted to provide that kind of explanation are, for instance, Obstfeld (1994) , Calvo (1998 b) , Cole and Kehoe (1996) ).
In this note I will take a different tack, and explore the underpinnings of a model in which a key factor behind the spread of the Russian shock lies at the heart of the capital market. So I will not shift the focus away from the financial sector, but I will explore the possibility that Wall Street could help spread the virus. The basic ideas have been summarized in Calvo (1998 c and d) in an informal way. The present note continues the analysis by providing a more formal discussion of the central insights.
The key notion underlying the models is that knowing about emerging-market economies involves large fixed costs relative to the size of investment projects. Learning about an 2 The economics of margin calls or, more generally, of collaterals will not be discussed in this paper. 3 individual country is costly. One has to learn about its economy and politics, which requires a team of experts constantly monitoring those variables. Economies change at a rapid pace, especially in emerging-market economies with incipient political systems. Thus, monitoring has to be frequent and in depth. However, there is no great cost differential between learning about macro variables in the U.S. and, say, a small country like Paraguay. In fact, a large country like the U.S. may exhibit more stability in its macro variables, making frequent monitoring less necessary. Therefore, fixed learning costs may be especially relevant for small emerging-market economies.
Fixed costs generate economies of scale and, hence, the financial industry is likely to organize itself around clusters of specialists. This makes it plausible to assume that there exists a set of informed and a set of uninformed investors. The former likely leverage their portfolios (those who know better about a given project have incentives to borrow to finance it) and, thus, are potentially liable to margin calls. 2 In fact, to all accounts, important specialists invested in Russian debt and were subject to margin calls as its value plunged after repudiation. Section II starts from this observation and presents two models for explaining the behavior of the uninformed. In both models, the problem faced by the uninformed is that they can only observe price and, occasionally, some details of the investment strategy followed by specialists.
However, if they see the latter selling emerging-market securities, or, more simply, staying out of auctions of new bonds, for example, they could not tell exactly whether it reflects negative information about those securities or that the specialists were subject to margin calls. Thus, they face a "signal extraction" problem. The first model in Section II will show an example in which if the volatility of emerging-markets returns is high relative to, say, margin calls, then it will be rational to attach high probability that the signal received by the uninformed reflects conditions in emerging markets. The second model in Section II gets essentially the same result in terms of a more elementary setup. Thus, these models help to rationalize a situation in which the capital market (the uninformed part of it) took the events surrounding the Russian shock as indication that there were fundamental problems with emerging markets in general, and tried to pull their funds from all of them. The Appendix shows that these phenomena can be captured in terms of a general equilibrium model, patterned after Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) . The main difference with the latter is that I assume that the uninformed can observe informed investors' trades, albeit imprecisely.
Section III explores "multiplier" effects that magnify the initial shock. It pursues some ideas developed in Calvo (1998 d) according to which a sudden stop in capital inflows (provoked by the Russian shock, for example) can wreak havoc on financial systems, unless financial contracts are indexed to the sudden-stop state of nature (which is unlikely when the shock comes via Russia and margin calls in Wall Street). It will be argued that this channel may give rise to multiple equilibria, but the relatively novel insight is that, even under equilibrium uniqueness, the sudden-stop channel may produce multiplier effects that help to magnify the initial shock.
Section IV concludes, and discusses possible extensions.
II. Signal Extraction. Two Simple Models
This section will discuss two simple models in which rational but imperfectly informed individuals may take a signal emitted by informed investors as a good indicator of prospects in y s m = − .
(1) emerging markets. The signal is imperfect and sometimes reflects conditions inherent to informed investors-like the margin calls that reportedly took place after Russia decided to repudiate some of its debt-and provide no information on emerging markets. Thus, these models
show that emerging markets could be innocent victims of shocks that lie completely outside their realm and control. This insight is further explored in the Appendix in terms of a complete general equilibrium framework. The case ú1 is very interesting because it shows the possibility that uninformed investors will react very strongly even though the change in y is provoked, say, by margin calls.
Our formal results imply that one can get ú1 even though 2 is 'large'. For, what is actually required is that 2 be small relative to
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. A characteristic of emerging-markets economies is the relatively high volatility of variables like terms of trade (see Hausmann and Rojas-Suarez (1996) ), which will be reflected in large 2 . On the other hand, margin calls and serious liquidity problems in Wall Street are likely to be more the exception than the rule. Consequently, the case for 2 / 2 large is not hard to make. In this context, the Russian shock can be interpreted as the outcome of a large positive shock to m, e.g., large margin calls, which resulted in a sizable cut in observed y. 
P s y Hence, the set of
where P is the probability measure on . As a result, as P(m
Therefore, again, uninformed investors are going to attach a large probability to the "bad"
) has low probability.
III. Sudden Stop. Multiplier Effect
Extensions to a dynamic setting could rationalize positive and negative shocks to emerging markets coming from Wall Street but, unless one introduces serial correlation, there will be a quick reversion to the mean. Serial correlation could be introduced through random variables s and/or m, but this is not a satisfactory modeling strategy. Much better would be to obtain serial correlation from fundamental economic considerations. Moreover, if the analysis rested there, large shocks to emerging markets would be predicated on the existence of equivalently large Wall Street shocks. This is possible, but more interesting would be to identify
mechanisms that magnify Wall Street shocks. The present section will identify 'multiplier' effects, and channels that might contribute to serial correlation in dynamic settings.
I have argued elsewhere that a sudden stop (i.e., a sizable and largely unanticipated stop)
in capital inflows could result in a collapse of marginal productivity of capital in emergingmarkets economies (Calvo (1998 c) The sudden-stop effect can be captured by postulating that the unconditional expectation of s is a positive function of the difference between k and, say, its expected value from previous period's perspective. Taking the latter as given, one can thus simply write for some differentiable function . Function is likely to be concave as a drop in k is likely to ( )
have a larger impact than an equivalent rise.
By equations (4) and (5), The expression on the right-hand side of equation (6) is an increasing function of k. Therefore, the sudden-stop effect is capable of giving rise to multiplicity of equilibria. This is possible because, for example, a smaller k lowers the expected marginal productivity of capital (i.e., lowers ), which induces a lower demand for k. But even in cases where equilibrium is unique, s the sudden-stop component implies interesting results. Thus, for instance, assuming (1-)K' ' < 1, we get, by totally differentiating expression (6) with respect to y,
The direct impact of y on k is K' but, by (7), the impact is magnified by multiplier
Interestingly, the direct impact of y on k increases with -which, by last section's analysis is attributed to a larger relative variance of the marginal productivity of capital-while the multiplier is lower as rises. The net effect of a rise in is ambiguous. To show it, differentiate (7) with respect to ; thus, The bracketed expression in the numerator of the right-hand side of expression (8) can be of either sign.
Modeling the Demand for Emerging Markets Securities, K.
Calvo (1998 b) and Calvo and Mendoza (1998) show that as the capital market gets more globalized, the response of investors to news about expected returns (as a proportion of a country's investment) may increase without bound.
It is worth noting that K'/K will also be large if K is 'small' (one way of characterizing emerging markets), and K' is somewhat invariant to K (i.e., total investment in emerging markets). Thus, for example, this property would hold in a portfolio model in which returns are normally distributed and the utility function exhibits constant absolute risk aversion, because K is linear in the rate of return (= s, in this paper's notation) and, hence, K' is totally invariant with respect to K (see the Appendix).
These examples illustrate the possibility that being small in a globalized capital market may make K'/K large, magnifying the damage caused by a negative signal coming from the capital market. (For further discussion, see the Appendix.)
IV. Final Words
•
The key insight of the above analysis is that under asymmetric information, rational but imperfectly informed investors could react very strongly to signals emitted by informed individuals. Those signals, in turn, may be due to factors that are relevant to informed individuals (e.g., margin calls) but that bear no relationship to fundamentals in emergingmarkets economies. Moreover, sudden-stop effects contribute to the existence of multiple equilibria, and may give rise to multiplier effects. These elements help to explain why the Russian shock so virulently spread beyond Russia and still lingers on after a long period in which it has become apparent that much of the global turmoil was caused by problems in the capital market itself (e.g., margin calls), and little or nothing to new problems in emerging-market economies (except Russia).
• The paper does not discuss how the signal is emitted by the informed. This is an important issue that may be left for another occasion. However, it is worth pointing out that specialists may send a negative signal even if they do not run down their stock of emerging-markets securities. This is so because emerging markets exhibit current account deficits that need financing. Thus, absence (or diminished presence) of specialists in the auctioning of new emerging-markets securities is likely to be noticed and taken as a negative signal.
• This note places special emphasis on quantity signals, while much of the traditional finance literature has focused on price signals (e.g., Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), Wang (1994) (1990) and, more recently, Kodres and Pritsker (1998) ).
• The paper assumes the existence of one homogeneous emerging-markets security.
Extensions are straightforward. A simple extension is to assume that there is a variety of securities, indexed by i = 1,. . .,I. Let us assume that (1) the returns on securities are mutually independent random variables, (2) the unconditional distribution for the return on security i is the same for all i, and (3) stochastically independent could be a better approximation. Clearly, increasing the number of markets in this case yields no informational bonus. Actually, Calvo and Mendoza (1999) show examples where incentives to collect information declines with the number of markets, which would worsen the forecast-error problem.
• The above models are static, while sudden-stop effects are essentially dynamic. An unexpected change in the demand for emerging-markets securities causes disruptions in the financial sector because (in a richer, though straightforward, model) it brings about unexpected changes in relative prices. Thus, in a realistic scenario with incomplete financial contracts (in which, for instance, the loan rate of interest is not made contingent on variables like y), a change in relative prices may cause bankruptcy and, through that channel, bring about a fall in the marginal productivity of capital. However, these effects are likely transitory. As firms are dismantled, new firms will spring to life. Thus, the initial drop in the marginal productivity of capital may be followed by a renaissance in which marginal productivity increases over time and even overshoots its value prior to crisis.
• A deeper analysis, of course, will have to rationalize why loan interest rates are not indexed to observables like y. One answer is that y may be observable but hard to verify (Townsend (1976) ). Another is that indexation to y is likely to be a function of the indexation rules adopted in other contracts since, for example, a given firm's financial difficulties likely depend on the financial situation of its clients and suppliers (through the interenterprise-credit channel, for example)-the latter, in turn, being a function of the adopted indexation formulas. The complexity of the problem may be so great that one could possibly invoke bounded-rationality considerations for market incompleteness.
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Appendix
I will show that the asymmetric-information results discussed in Section II can be obtained in a conventional general equilibrium context in which the uninformed make their forecasts on the basis of quantity decisions taken by the informed (extensions to the case in which uninformed investors also look at prices are discussed later in the Appendix).
I will borrow the basic framework from Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) , GS. There are two periods (present and future), and two assets: a safe asset (a pure bond, say) yielding units of future output, and a risky asset yielding r units of future output (this asset could be identified as an "emerging-markets assets"). Let us assume Informed investors will be assumed to know s but no . Thus, contrary to Section II, information is incomplete, even for informed investors. This is a necessary assumption in the present context-in which, following GS, I allow for unlimited short sales-to ensure a well-defined optimal portfolio. Letting and denote the initial stock of the safe and risky assets, 
The utility function exhibits constant absolute risk aversion, CARA, and thus can be expressed as follows:
where is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion.
As noted, informed investors know s but not (only its distribution). On the other hand, uninformed investors know the distribution of both variables, but can directly observe neither.
Within each type, investors are identical. Thus, I will use subindex I and U to indicate the per capita portfolio choices of the informed and uninformed investors, respectively.
I will assume that all the random variables defined here are mutually stochastically independent. Under these assumptions, the informed investors' optimal portfolio can be shown to satisfy (see GS):
Uninformed investors are not totally in the dark about s. They do not have a long and stable stock market series from which they can infer something about s, but I will assume that they can observe the actions of the informed, subject to some noise z. Formally, I assume that the 5 GS assumes that the total supply of the risky asset is random and the uninformed cannot observe it directly. Our results carry over to that case with just minor formal changes. The present assumption, however, will help to draw a sharp distinction between quantity and price signals. Thus, by (13) and (14) for the uninformed satisfies:
Therefore, by (16) and (17), we get, Notice that, as expected, if informed and uninformed have the same information (i.e., z = 0, 2 = 0), we have = 1, and equation (18) boils down to (13). In all other cases, however, signaling error, represented by z, is a factor in the portfolio decisions of the uninformed.
The model is closed by imposing equilibrium conditions. Assuming a fixed net supply of assets, and assuming total supply of the risky asset equals 1, we can state the general equilibrium condition as follows:
where is the share of informed investors in total population, and total population is set equal to unity. A brief look at equations (13) and (18) shows that, given s and z, equation (19) 
I will focus on the case in which the denominator is positive, since it (plausibly) implies a positive association between s and equilibrium p. Armed with this result, it is straightforward to show, for instance, that the variance of equilibrium price becomes Thus, the unconditional variance of p is larger, the larger is the SS effect, . Interestingly, the SS effect vanishes as 2 / 2 goes to zero. This is so because for 2 / 2 small, the uninformed respond almost exclusively to informed investors' behavior, and tend to ignore a priori information about s. However, SS effects are likely to increase the variance of s, 2 , a channel that is disregarded in this analysis.
Would equilibrium change if the uninformed extracted information from prices? The answer is "no" in the extreme case examined earlier in which the informed are of measure zero.
Prices would just reflect what the uninformed learn from the informed investors' trades, and nothing else. The information obtained by informed investors does not get reflected in prices because they are insignificant players. However, if > 0, prices will convey additional information. Conceivably, information contained in prices could be so good that the uninformed will altogether stop looking at trades. This would be the case at equilibria in which prices are fully revealing, i.e., p reveals s (an example is shown below). However, if prices are not fully revealing (see, for instance, the examples discussed in GS), the uninformed investors would still have incentives to use information about informed investors' trades. This implies that the effects highlighted in this paper will still hold in the richer model. It would, however, be interesting to gain a deeper understanding about the interaction between price and quantity signals as the share s p − = ρ αω 2 1.
(26)
of the informed investors, and other parameters are varied.
It is useful to contrast the equilibrium concept developed above with the one in GS. GS assumes that individuals can observe market prices but not quantities. Interestingly, under the GS assumptions, there exists an equilibrium in which the uninformed would be able have exactly the same information as informed investors! To see this, let us assume that the statement holds true. Thus, since both types have the same utility function, the equilibrium condition in the risky-asset market will be, recalling (13) and (19), Therefore, in that equilibrium s would be fully revealed by prices (since s = 2 + p). 6 Clearly, as pointed out above, if the economy settles down to this equilibrium, uninformed investors will have no incentive to learn about informed investors' trades. 
